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J. INTRODUCTION 
I am going to argue that the concept of the common good-a concept 
of which the modem secular legal academy has lost sight-plays an essen-
tial role in an adequate theory of legal and, more specifically, constitutional 
interpretation. The concept of the common good fills a gap in the current 
understanding of legal and constitutional interpretation. 
First, I will discuss the legal academy's understanding of the determi-
nacyl of legal materials. J will show how outcomes in legal cases2 are occa-
sionally underdetermined, that is, the legal materials governing a case leave 
the judge with some discretion. I will describe two analytically distinct 
causes of this underdeterminacy. The first is the universal nature of legal 
texts as applied to concrete, contingent circumstances. The second, broader 
* Article presented at the inaugural conference of the Terrence 1. Murphy Institute for 
Catholic Thought, Law and Public Policy, The Catholic Intellectual Tradition and the Good 
Society, April 9, 2005, at the University of St. Thomas School of Law, Minneapolis, Minnesota. 
** Assistant Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law. I would like to thank my loving 
wife Elizabeth for her sacrifice to allow me to write this article. I would also like to thank the 
faculty of Ave Maria School of Law who participated in a faculty workshop on this article and 
those who offered helpful comments at the conference. The comments from the conference are not 
incorporated into this article, unless otherwise noted. 
This article is my first attempt to elaborate an originalist theory of the process of legal and 
constitutional interpretation. I recognize that many ideas and arguments need further clarification, 
explanation and thought, which I intend to do in future writings. 
1. I will define determinacy shortly. 
2. I want to concentrate on legal cases, that is, where a lawsuit has been filed, instead of the 
broader category of nonlegal cases which involve those instances of conduct that do not result in a 
lawsuit and where a person's actions were determinately legal or illegal under the law. For exam-
ple, in writing the first paragraph of this article, I did not slander Gore Vidal. This is an instance 
where my actions were determinately legaL This example is used and explained in Lawrence B. 
Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma. 54 U. Chi. L Rev. 462, 471 
(1987). 
48 
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cause is the underdetermined nature of and relationship between legal 
materials-statutes, cases, legal rules and principles-more generally. 
Second, I will provide a rough overview of the nature of law as de-
scribed by the Catholic intellectual tradition. This overview will discuss the 
characteristics of law, the nature of the legislative process, and the role of 
the judge. Central to this understanding is the common good. 
Lastly, I will apply this understanding to statutory and constitutional 
interpretation and show how in each instance the common good must playa 
role because of the underdetermined nature of legal adjudication. In doing 
so, I will show how the Catholic intellectual tradition provides rich concep-
tual resources upon which to draw. 
The Catholic intellectual tradition, as I use the phrase, refers to the 
intellectual tradition that has its foundation in Aristotle,3 was largely syn-
thesized with Christian thought by St. Thomas,4 and which has continued 
with recent proponents including Alasdair MacIntyre,5 John Finnis,6 Robert 
P. George,7 and Russell Rittinger,8 among many others. 
II. CURRENT UNDERSTANDING OF LEGAL DETERMINACY 
A. Introduction 
In this Part I will discuss two causes of underdeterminacy in legal 
cases. Secular scholars have identified situations of legal un-
derdeterminacy, but they have generally failed to provide a reason for how 
3. See Aristotle, Metaphysics: Books X-XIV (Hugh Tredennick trans., Harv. U. Press 1981); 
Aristotle, Metaphysics: Books I-IX (Hugh Tredennick trans., Harv. U. Press 1979); Aristotle, The 
Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (D. P. Chase trans., I. M. Dent & Sons 1915) [hereinafter 
Nicomachean Ethics]; Aristotle, Aristotle's Politics (Benjamin Jowett trans., The Modem Lib. 
1943). See also Richard Kraut, Aristotle: Political Philosophy (Oxford U. Press 1(01). 
4. See S1. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles (D. of Notre Dame Press 1975); St. 
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I-II, qq. 90-97 (Benzinger Bros. 1947) [hereinafter Summa 
Theologica]. See also John Ennis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory (Oxford U. Press 
1998); Ralph McInerny, St. Thomas Aquinas (U. of Notre Dame Press 1982); Josef Pieper, Guide 
to Thomas Aquinas (Ignatius Press 1991). 
5. See Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Vir-
tues (Open Court Publg. Co. 1999); Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics: A History of 
Moral Philosophy from the Homeric Age to the Twentieth Century (1d ed., U. of Notre Dame 
Press 1998); Alasdair MacIntyre. Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Geneal-
ogy, and Tradition (U. of Notre Dame Press 1990); Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? (U. of Notre Dame Press 1988); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral 
Theory (1d ed., U. of Notre Dame Press 1984). See also Alasdair MacIntyre (Mark C. Murphy ed., 
Cambridge U. Press 2(03). 
6. See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford U. Press 1980). 
7. See Robert P. George, The Clash of Orthodoxies: Law, Religion, and Morality in Crisis 
(Intercollegiate Stud. Inst. 2(01); Robert P. George, In Defense of Natural Law (Oxford U. Press 
1999); Robert P. George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (Oxford U. 
Press 1993). 
8. See Russell Hittinger, The First Grace: Rediscovering the Natural Law in the Post-Chris-
tian World (lSI Books 1(03); Russell Hittinger, A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory (U. of 
Notre Dame Press 1987). 
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our society-and judges in particular-should respond to that un-
derdeterminacy. And those who have provided such reasons have failed to 
arrive at a consensus. The concept of the common good provides a missing 
element. 
The issue of the determinacy or indeterminacy of legal texts and 
materials9-such as statutes, case law, legal principles and rules, and the 
theoretical justification for an area of the law-remains one of the most 
contentious issues in jurisprudence. Before proceeding, I will provide defi-
nitions of key terms used throughout this Article. Legal materials are inde-
terminate when the legal materials "[do] not place any limit on the possible 
results" in a case.lO This means that a judge presiding over a case could 
reach any result because the law does not constrain the judge's judgment. 
Legal materials are underdeterminate, by contrast, when "the outcome [of a 
legal case) must be chosen on grounds other than the law itself ... from a 
range of possible results that are consistent with and limited by the law."ll 
In practice this means that the outcomes of a case-and the judge's discre-
tion-are limited by the law. Lastly, the law is determinate when the judge 
has no discretion and the result in a case is limited to one outcome by the 
law. 
Scholars are divided over the existence and extent of indeterminacy in 
legal materials. Some, such as Ronald Dworkin, strive to show that, when 
properly understood, the law in a mature legal system such as our own 
provides "right answers" even in the hardest case, and therefore there is no 
indeterminacy or underdeterminacy.12 Others, particularly critical legal 
scholars, argue that, because the law is riddled with indeterminacy, judges 
have unlimited discretion, and that the "legal system [simply] reinforces 
relations of social and economic domination while retaining the appearance 
of neutrality and autonomy."13 For critical legal scholars, the "law is radi-
cally indeterminate, incoherent, and contradictory."14 
Most legal scholars acknowledge that legal materials are un-
derdetermined. 15 Professor Ken Kress has expressed this consensus: "[T]he 
9. In this article I will use the terms law and legal materials synonymously unless the 
context indicates a different meaning. 
10. Solum, supra n. 2, at 473. 
11. /d. (emphasis added). See also Ken Kress, Legal indeterminacy, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 283, 
283 (1989) ("[L]egal questions lack single right answers."). 
12. See e.g. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 286 (Harv. U. Press 1977). 
13. Solum, supra n. 2, at 470. 
14. Kress, supra n. 11, at 283. 
15. See e.g. Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty 
118 (Princeton U. Press 2004) (noting that legal text, like all language. has limits); Kress, supra n. 
11, at 283 ("[T]he indeterminacy of the law is no more than moderate."); Solum, supra n. 2, at 503 
("[S]cholars ... are right to identify significant zones of underdetermination and contingency in 
legal doctrine."); Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning. Original 
Intent. and Judicial Review 5-14 (U. Press of Kan. 1999) (arguing that constitutional text has 
limited meaning and that, at the point that meaning ends, constitutional construction must occur). 
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indeterminacy of the law is no more than moderate and [I] reject critical 
legal scholars' arguments for radical indeterminacy."16 
B. Underdeterminacy Caused by the Universal Nature of Legal Texts 
In this subsection I will discuss how underdeterminacy may arise when 
general legal terms and rules, such as those found in statutes, are applied to 
concrete circumstances. This particular indeterminacy of application, 
though analytically distinct from underdeterminacy caused by the un-
derdetermined nature of legal materials more generally (which is discussed 
in the next subsection), will in practice often be related. 
Let me begin with a hypothetical similar to that utilized by legal phi-
losophers in the discussion of legal indeterminacy.17 Suppose that the city 
council of a small city in Iowa with few ordinances on the books, and none 
dealing with the subject matter of parks, passes an ordinance which states: 
"No vehicles in the park." The council was reacting to complaints by park 
patrons that teenagers were periodically driving four-wheelers through the 
park, terrorizing the patrons. Next, imagine that the following day a park 
patron, while playing tennis on the court in the middle of the park, suffers a 
heart attack. Others call 911 and the ambulance rushes to aid the stricken 
patron. The ambulance driver drives to the middle of the park, collects the 
patron, and rushes back to the hospital just in time to save the patron's life. 
Lastly, assume that the local prosecutor-being a flrm believer in the 
rule of law18-initiates a prosecution of the ambulance driver for violating 
the city ordinance. The judge in the case is faced with a difflcult question: 
does the ordinance's proscription of "[n]o vehicles in the park" apply to the 
ambulance driver who entered the park to aid a stricken park patron? 
This hypothetical shows the existence of different levels of determi-
nacy regarding the application of legal texts to concrete circumstances. For 
legal texts there is a core of determinacy, surrounded by a penumbra of 
underdeterminacy, and both are encompassed by a sea of determinacy. 
First, there are countless determinate applications of the ordinance. For ex-
ample, if I drive my Ford Escort to the tennis court in the middle of the park 
simply because I am too lazy to park in the parking lot and walk to the 
tennis court, most would agree that the ordinance would determinately ap-
ply to my actions. 
16. Kress, supra n. II, at 283. 
17. See e.g. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law 126 (2d ed., Oxford U. Press 1994). 
18. For a discussion of the value of rules of law rather than standards or principles see 
Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 39-46 (1997); Antonin 
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1176-82 (1989); see also 
Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, When a "Rule" Doesn't Rule: The Failure of the Oregon Em-
ployment Division v. Smith "Hybrid Rights Exception", 108 Penn. St. L. Rev. 573, 605-08 
(2003) (discussing Scalia's view on rules of law). 
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Second, there is a penumbral area of underdeterminacy. Two sources 
of underdeterminacy become apparent through application. The first is the 
imprecise extent of written terms: the ill-defined extent of the category of 
social reality to which the terms refer. 19 Is a go-cart included? A horse-and-
buggy? These and other marginal objects that mayor may not be within the 
socially constructed meaning of the term "vehicle" cause underdeterminacy. 
The second source of underdeterminacy is where the context is such 
that application of the term or rule produces results clearly contrary to the 
intended scope of the term or rule. For instance, most would agree that the 
conventional meaning of the ordinance's term "vehicle" includes ambu-
lances, especially in light of the council's use of "vehicle" in response to 
four-wheelers, which lie on the outer edge of conventional use of the term 
"vehicle." Most would also, however, have great unease at application of 
the ordinance to the life-saving ambulance driver. 
There are innumerable instances where seemingly clear rules, such as 
the city's ordinance, may become indeterminate in application. What is the 
result in our hypothetical if a prosecution is brought against a child riding 
his bicycle through the park? Or against a teenager who uses his four-
wheeler to rescue a park patron? Or against an ambulance driver who drives 
an ambulance through the park to test the ambulance's four-wheel drive 
capabilities? One can readily see how a seemingly clear and determinate 
rule may be indeterminate in application. 
The indeterminacy in application of legal rules is caused by the univer-
sality of legal terms. The city council in our hypothetical created a legal 
rule that forbids all vehicles at all times for any reason in the park. This 
prohibition on vehicles in the park was the council's response to the partic-
ular problem of teenagers on four-wheelers, but the ordinance swept much 
more broadly. The ordinance did not take into account circumstances that, 
had the council thought of them, would have caused the council to alter the 
ordinance's broadness and/or create exceptions to the ordinance; for exam-
ple, for emergency vehicles performing emergency services. 
However, one must not hastily conclude that, even in this penumbral 
area, the lack of determinacy is radical. A judge in the park-ordinance hypo-
thetical faced with the prosecution of the life-saving ambulance driver can-
not rule for Mickey Mouse, and is therefore constrained. Or the judge 
cannot flip a coin to determine the outcome of the case. The judge's discre-
tion, though real, remains limited to arguments that are plausible within our 
legal practice. 
Third, beyond core determinate applications of the ordinance, and the 
underdeterminate penumbral area caused by indeterminacy of application, 
there is a broad sea of determinacy. These are situations where it is clear 
19. For a discussion of terminological categories and their relationship to socially con-
structed categories see Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 571, 577-88 (1987). 
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that the ordinance is inapplicable. In writing this article, for example, I did 
not violate the hypothetical ordinance. 
What the example of the city's "[n]o vehicles in the park" ordinance 
shows is that legal texts, although they may at first appear to be determi-
nate, may be indeterminate in their application to concrete circumstances. 
The example also demonstrates that the indeterminacy is not pervasive and 
is instead a limited underdeterminacy. 
C. Limited Legal Indeterminacy Caused by the Undetermined Nature of 
Legal Materials 
In this subsection I will broaden my focus from legal texts to the 
broader universe of legal materials. This universe includes legal rules and 
principles, statutes and case law, and the theoretical justifications/explana-
tions for particular areas of the law.20 Most scholars conclude that the out-
comes in some cases are underdetermined by the legal materials and that 
judges have limited discretion in such instances?l 
There are a number of causes of underdeterminacy related to legal 
materials. These include: (I) the choice in determining which of the uni-
verse of legal materials is pertinent to a particular case; (2) the choice in 
determining how the pertinent legal materials relate to each other; (3) relat-
edly, the choice in determining the relative authority of the pertinent legal 
materials; and (4) the choice in determining which theoretical structure of 
the law is best. 
Let me start with another famous case used by legal philosophers to 
explain the nature of, and interplay between, legal materials.22 The case is 
Riggs v. Palmer and the facts are fairly straightforward.23 Riggs involved a 
will made by Palmer in which Palmer gave the bulk of his estate to his 
grandson, Elmer Palmer.24 Fearing that Palmer might change his will and 
cut Elmer out of it, Elmer murdered Palmer.25 Under the conventional 
meaning of New York's Statute of Wills, standing alone, the will was valid 
and Elmer was entitled to inherit Palmer's estate under it; the statute said 
nothing regarding the murder of a testator by the main beneficiary of a 
wi1l. 26 
20. By "theoretical justifications/explanations for particular areas of the law" I am referring 
to Dworkinian structures of the law. See e.g. Dworkin, supra n. 12, at 116-17 ("[TIle judge] must 
construct a scheme of abstract and concrete principles that provides a coherent justification for all 
common law precedents and, so far as these are to be justified on principle, constitutional and 
statutory provisions as wel1."). 
21. See supra n. 15 and accompanying text (discussing the scholarly consensus that legal 
materials are underdetermined). 
22. See e.g. Ronald Dworkin. Law's Empire 15-20 (Harv. U. Press 1986). 
23. Riggs v. Palmer. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). 
24. Id. 
25. !d. at 189. 
26. Id. 
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Despite the clear, unrestricted language of the statute, the court ruled 
that Elmer would not inherit under the Will.27 The majority reached that 
result by relying on the "fundamental maxim[]" that "[n]o one shall be 
permitted to profit by his own ... wrong."28 When understood in light of 
this principle, the legal rules of the statute did not compel the conclusion 
that Elmer take under the will and instead led to the result-directly con-
trary to the conventional meaning of the text of the statute-that Elmer was 
legally prohibited from taking under the will. 29 
We can see in the Riggs case the operation of legal rules-rules re-
garding the creation and enforcement of wills-and the legal principle-
that no man shall profit by his own wrong. We can also see that these rules 
and principles come from statute and case law. Lastly, we can see that the 
judges in Riggs construed New York's will statute against a background of 
legal materials, and that the judges believed their job was to construe the 
will statute so as to be consistent with the legal background, including its 
legal principles. In doing so, the judges provided a justificatory structure 
for the area of law. 
For the majority, the principle that ordered the subsidiary legal materi-
als to create a justificatory legal structure was: no man shall profit by his 
own wrong. The dissenters in Riggs concluded that the legal principle relied 
upon by the majority did not govern in the Riggs case because of the princi-
ple of separation of powers, and therefore the conventional meaning of the 
text of the will statute controlled to permit Elmer to take under the wilpo 
The Riggs case presents a discrete example of our complex legal sys-
tem: its different components and the interaction of those components. But 
one can see from this example that cases present judges with numerous 
instances where the judges must exercise judgment regarding which legal 
materials to bring to bear on the case and how those materials relate to each 
other. In Riggs, for instance, the judges had to determine which legal rules 
and principles governed the case and how those legal materials related to 
each other: did the principles constrain the rules (or vice-versa), and if so, in 
what manner? 
More broadly, in our legal system, which is thick with legal materials 
bearing on nearly every legal case or issue, judges will have to exercise 
judgment because there is no mechanical means by which a judge can con-
clude which legal materials bear on a particular legal issue or case and how 
those materials relate to each other. The legal materials will therefore often 
underdetermine the outcome of (at least hard) cases. 
27. ld. at 191. 
28. ld. at 190. 
29. /d. at 190-91. 
30. /d. at 191-93 (Gray. J., dissenting). 
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III. THE NATURE OF THE LEGAL PROCESS IN THE CATHOLIC 
INTELLECTUAL TRADITION 
A. Law Is a Purposive Instrument to Pursue the Common Good 
55 
As understood by the Catholic intellectual tradition, law has four char-
acteristics: law is "[1] an ordinance of reason [2] for the common good, [3] 
made by him who has care of the community, and [4] promulgated."31 The 
common good is central to the nature of law. The legislator determines what 
the common good of society requires and molds legislation to enable soci-
ety to effectively pursue that good. 
The common good is a difficult concept to grasp in individualist 
America because its focus is the community. Further, the concept of the 
common good is premised on an understanding of the nature of man that is 
foreign to many, one that is teleological. In the Catholic intellectual tradi-
tion, man's end is happiness in this world and Beatitude in the next,32 Hap-
piness in this world consists of becoming fully human: fulfilling one's 
telos.33 More particularly, human happiness is acting rationally excellently, 
that is, with virtue.34 However, doing so requires goods which the individ-
ual cannot procure qua individual: virtue and the material necessities to 
enable one to act virtuously.35 
The common good provides the ordered community that is necessary 
for individuals to achieve happiness (which they cannot procure for them-
selves). The common good consists of, among other things, justice, law, 
friendship,36 the dignity of man, and fraternallove;37 goods which all mem-
bers of society-in an ordered manner-together pursue.38 As Professor V. 
Bradley Lewis summarizes: "The common good of any community, then, is 
an order of parts that explains and enables their coherence and activity 
without damaging their own internal integrity."39 
The legislator,40 prior to legislating, has in his mind "the type of the 
order of those things that are to be done by those who are subject to his 
31. Summa Theologica, supra n. 4, at 1-2, q. 90, a. 4. 
32. /d. at 1-2, q. 5, a. 3. 
33. Nicomachean Ethics, supra n. 3, at 1097b-1098a. 
34. Summa Theologica, supra n. 4, at 1-2, q. 3, a. 5. 
35. /d. at 1-2 q. 4, aa. 6-8; id. at 1-2, q. 57 a. 5. 
36. In the Aristotelian political sense of the word. 
37. Jacques Maritain, Man and the State 59 (U. of Chi. Press 1951); see also Jacques Mari-
tain, The Person and the Common Good 29 (John J. Fitzgerald trans., U. of Notre Dame Press 
1966) ("Because the common good is the human common good, it includes ... the service of the 
human person."). 
38. See V. Bradley Lewis, The Common Good in Classical Political Philosophy 5 (Forth-
coming in Current Issues in Catholic Higher Education); see also id. at 8 ("[T]he common good 
[is] constituted by [a] set of conditions supportive of and/or constitutive of genuine human 
flourishing."). 
39. /d. at 5. 
40. Although there is an extensive debate surrounding the topic, see e.g. Dworkin, supra n. 
12, at 314-37 (arguing that there is no collective intent of a body such as Congress), for purposes 
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government."41 In other words, the legislator sees a problem in society and 
conceives of an alternative social ordering to eliminate the problem and 
ensure a more effective pursuit of the common good. The source of positive 
law is the legislator's intellect, his reason participating in the eternallaw.42 
Then, through legislation, the legislator recreates that order in the members 
and institutions of society. 43 
The craft analogy is apt.44 Like a sculptor who has in his mind prior to 
carving an image of the thing to be carved out of the stone, the legislator 
has in his mind prior to legislating a picture of what he wants to occur in 
society as a result of his legislation. The legislator understands what the 
common good of the society requires and molds legislation to enable soci-
of this article, I avoid delving into the question of intent of corporate bodies such as Congress. Let 
me note that it is not clear that my arguments require the attribution of a state of mind to collective 
entities such as Congress. As explained in the text regarding interpretation of the Constitution, the 
immediate object of interpretation is not the state of mind of the legislator. Rather, the object is the 
publicly-accessible meaning of the text. In other words, although the legislator's "intent" is the 
authoritative law, our ability to know that "intent" is limited. What we have more ready access to 
is the artifact of the legislator's intent-the legal text-and the text's context which, depending on 
the circumstances, will more or less approximate the legislator's intent. See Whittington, supra n. 
15, at 165-66, 191-94 (arguing that one can access the "intent" of legislators by looking to the 
written terms used and the context in which they were used). 
41. Summa Theologica, supra n. 4, at 1-2, q. 93 a. I. 
42. [d. at 1-2, q. 93 a. I. 
43. The human legislator makes the natural law effective and moves society toward the com-
mon good through two separate means: deduction and determinatio. Through the processes of 
how positive law makes natural law effective, one can see that the authority or source of positive 
law is the legislator's intellect-his reason participating in the eternal law. Law, in all its forms 
(eternal, divine, natural, and positive), is a reflection of (a part of) reality, of being, and-because 
its ultimate origination is God-the fullness of being. Man is like God in his ability to reason and 
through his reason participates in God's reason which is His regulation of Himself and creation. 
As Aquinas stated, human law is "derived from the natural law in two ways: first, as a conclusion 
from premises, secondly, by way of determination of certain generalities." [d. at 1-2, q. 95 a. 2. 
Through these two processes, human law "is a dictate of the practical reason." [d. at 1-2, q. 91 a. 
3. For instance, the law that one must not commit murder is derived from the principle that one 
shall do no harm to any man. 
Determinatio is complex and is meant to describe a situation where a legislator attempts to 
make the natural law effective in the myriad contingent circumstances facing his society. The 
result of determinatio will not be complete certainty because the matters for determination are 
contingent matters which do not allow for such exactness. As St. Thomas states, "Nor is it neces-
sary for every measure to be altogether unerring and certain, but according as it is possible in its 
own particular genus." [d. at 1-2, q. 91 a. 3. Here, the practical wisdom of the legislator is called 
to action to, within the broad bounds laid out in the natural law and deductions therefrom, order 
his society for the common good. Different laws will be directed to those different roles occupied 
by citizens (e.g., soldiers, governors, priests, farmers), the form of government of the society, and 
different human activities (commerce, family relations, property relations, etc.). [d. at 1-2, q. 95 a. 
4. 
A good example of determinatio is highway regulation. There are broad bounds within which 
a legislator must work: safety, efficiency, environmental protection, etc. Within these bounds the 
legislator must judge which of the countless combinations of traffic regulations would most ad-
vance the common good given the circumstances of the society. 
44. For a discussion of the role of the craft analogy in the Catholic intellectual tradition see 
MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions, supra n. 5, at 127, 130-31. 
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ety to effectively pursue that good. Law, to be law, must contribute to the 
common good of society.45 It must direct the members of society to act 
cooperatively in their different capacities.46 
In this way, law is a purposive instrument. Law's overarching purpose 
is to better secure the common good, while its specific purpose will vary 
depending on the particular goal the legislator has in mind for a particular 
statute. Law is an instrument or tool of the legislator to effect a change in 
society to better order society toward the common good. 
Societies, to enable their effective pursuit of the common good, must 
entrust the common good of the society to particular offices.47 The norms of 
the Catholic intellectual tradition do not require any particular set of offices 
with any particular set of powers. Our society has a specific social order-
ing, much of it embodied in the Constitution. One of our society's principle 
offices is that of legislator: the members of Congress. These office holders 
have the primary responsibility in our governmental structure, given by Ar-
ticle I, to create laws to order society to the pursuit of the common good. 
Other offices, the executive and judiciary, are entrusted with particular as-
pects of our society's pursuit of the common good.48 For example, the judi-
ciary is primarily entrusted with the adjudication of concrete disputes under 
the Constitution and laws created by Congress.49 
While the full meaning of a legal text is found in the legislator's con-
ceived-of alternative social ordering, judges applying a legal text do not 
have direct access to this and must instead use other means to determine the 
meaning of a legal text.50 In our society, the written text of a law is an 
45. Summa The%gica, supra n. 4, at 1-2. q. 90 a. 3. 
"Law" that does not contribute to the common good, but instead to the good of one or a 
group of individuals, contravenes the nature of society-the purpose of which is to help perfect its 
members. For instance, if a purported law only enriches one individual. (the tyrant for example), it 
does not serve the common good but one individual's "good." (Although the individual in fact 
also harms himself by enriching himself at the expense of others and thereby violating distributive 
justice.) 
46. Law must therefore prevent individuals from acting against other members of society 
through, for example, criminal and tort law. These laws help ensure the dignity of each individual 
and that members of society can go about their business-pursue their ends-without fear of 
harm. The law should also guide cooperative conduct of individuals into established paths, making 
social cooperation predictable and efficient, such as is attempted through the application of and 
adherence to contract and property law. 
47. See e.g. Hittinger, supra n. 8, at 68-69,76-77,93-94 (discussing the creation of offices 
with the duty and authority to care for the (or a portion of the) common good). 
48. [d.; see also Lee J. Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philosophical Traditions 
Within Constitutiona/lnterpretation: Originalism Grounded in the Central Western Philosophical 
Tradition, 28 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 909, 992-97 (2005) (arguing for originalism in part based 
on the limited authority given to the office of judge by the Constitution). 
49. U.S. Const. art. III; The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Strang, supra 
n. 48. at 992-97 (discussing the limited scope of authority given judges). 
50. The epistemological difficulty of determining the legislator'S intended meaning of a legal 
text occurs in any society, such as ours, which utilizes inanimate justice-we separate the law 
making from the law applying functions. The difficulty is compounded because our society does 
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"artifact"; it is the legislator's attempt to convey to society, in the clearest 
means possible, the conclusion of his own internal process of practical rea-
soning regarding the manner in which society must be ordered to effectively 
pursue the common good. Thus, the text is a strong indicator of the results 
of the legislator's practical reasoning, and in the normal course of adjudica-
tion regarding that statute, it will suffice to determine the outcome of a case. 
Relatedly, the context in which a legislator operated when crafting and 
adopting a legal text enables a judge to interpret the legal text in a manner 
that more closely approximates the legislator's intended ordering. The con-
text will include the broader cultural, religious, economic, and other social 
circumstances, as well as the more specific historical record: what social 
problem was the legislator acting upon; what does the legislative record 
reveal; who were the prominent figures arguing for and against the legal 
text in question? 
However, the text of a law is not and cannot be determinative in every 
case. This is because positive law is framed with the majority of cases in 
mind.51 According to Aristotle, "every law is necessarily universal."52 But 
the subject matter of law is the infinite variety of contingent circumstances 
of social life which admit of no universal categorization. Therefore, "it is 
not possible to speak . . . rightly in any universal or general statement" 
regarding the subject matter of law.53 The inaccurate universality of law is 
not the fault of a particular law or the fault of the lawmaker, "but is [in-
stead] inherent in the nature of the thing"54 because law governs human 
actions which defy universal rules and calls for the application of practical 
reason. This is the substance of Aristotle's concept of equity, discussed 
more fully below. 
B. Role and Character of the Judge 
Given the necessity of judges sometimes going beyond the conven-
tional meaning of the text of a law, the judge must have a particular type of 
character. Accordingly, within the Catholic intellectual tradition, the con-
cept of virtue also plays a central role in legal systems. Judges need certain 
virtues to be excellent judges, and most prominent among these are justice 
and practical wisdom. The just judge will have respect for and abide by the 
laws of his society. 
not condone the practice of having the legislator(s) testify regarding the intended meaning of a 
legal text regarding its application in a case. Further problems arise because, as noted supra n. 40, 
legislators in our society are collective entities, the membership of which, in some cases (such as 
the ratification of our Constitution) is not well-defined. 
51. Summa Theologica. supra n. 4. at 1-2. q. 96 a. I. 
52. Nicomachean Ethics, supra n. 3, at 1137b. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
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What undergirds Aristotle's claim that judges may decline to follow 
the conventional meaning of a legal text is the concept of justice,55 Aristotle 
defines justice as "act[ing] according to the law"-as the "lawful"-and as 
the "equal."56 For our purposes, we will concentrate on Aristotle's discus~ 
sion of justice as lawfulness, which encompasses both types of justice, 57 
Richard Kraut has explained Aristotle's conception of justice as lawfulness 
as "the intellectual and emotional skill one needs in order to do one's part in 
bringing it about that one's community possesses [a] stable system of rules 
and laws."s8 
Aristotle, in explaining justice as lawfulness and why the just man is 
obligated by the law, relates the law back to the common good: 
[F]urther, it is plain that all Lawful things are in a manner Just, 
because by Lawful we understand what have been defined by the 
legislative power and each of these we say is Just. The Laws too 
give directions on all points, aiming , . , at the common good of 
all[:] ... those things that are apt to produce and preserve happi-
ness and its ingredients for the social community. 59 
The law is the primary means by which the society secures the ordering 
necessary to secure the common good. The just person will therefore bring 
about and uphold society's laws. 
Under the concept of equity, to the extent it is impracticable for legis~ 
lators to govern all possible situations a priori with written laws, it is neces-
sary that judges have discretion, beyond the conventional meaning of the 
law, to render a judgment in accord with the natural law-in accord with 
the result of the legislator's practical reasoning on the needs of the common 
good for the society.60 When a judge sits in judgment of a case in which 
application of the conventional meaning of a law would be inequitable, the 
judge must "set right the omission [of an exception to the law] by ruling ... 
as the lawgiver himself would rule were he there present, and would have 
provided by law had he foreseen the case would arise."61 In Aristotle's vi-
sion of the law, when application of a law would not accord with the pur-
pose of the law, the judge must attempt to put himself in the role of the 
55. For a more in-depth discussion of Aristotle's tlJeory of equity, see Roger A. Shiner, 
Aristotle's Theory of Equity, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1245 (1994). 
56. Nicomachean Ethics, supra n. 3, at 1129a ("[AJnd so manifestly tlJe Just man will be, tlJe 
man who acts according to the law, and the equal man."). 
57. See Kraut, supra n. 3, at 102-03 (Oxford U. Press 2(02) (discussing the distinction be-
tween the two forms of justice). Kraut explains tlJat justice as lawfulness is tlJe virtue of following 
the laws of the community, while justice as equality is a more narrow concept of giving each his 
due. Id. at 106-07. For a more complete discussion of judicial virtue see generally Lawrence B. 
Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34 Metaphilosophy 178 (Jan. 
2(03) (available at bttp:llpapers.ssrn.comJso13/papers.cfm?abstracUd=369940). 
58. Kraut, supra n. 3, at 106. 
59. Nicomachean Ethics, supra n. 3, at 1129b. 
60. Summa Theoiogica, supra n. 4, at 1-2, q. 96 a. 1. 
61. Nicomachean Ethics, supra n. 3, at 1137b. 
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legislator who enacted the law to order society in a particular manner to-
ward the common good, and determine whether the legislator would have 
created an exception to the law had this particular case been in his con-
sciousness at the time of enactment. 
Further, if there is some error in the legislator'S transmission of his 
intention into written law, the duty of the judge is to seek the legislator's 
purpose-the legislator's intended means to enable society to effectively 
pursue the common good-and not follow the conventional meaning of the 
law. Kraut summarizes the disposition of the judge who respects the laws of 
his society: 
[Justice] does not require but in fact forbids casting a blind eye on 
the deficiencies of the law and mechanically doing whatever it 
requires. Justice consists not in obeying each and every law, but 
in supporting the legal framework as a whole. It is adherence to 
the law, but not to every particular law, however deficient.62 
The equitable judge is not acting in contradiction of the legislator. In-
stead, he is cooperating with the legislator to bring about the common 
good.63 The legislator'S goal is to, through law, bring about an ordering of 
society and its members to more effectively pursue the common good. Law 
is a blunt instrument to do so, and on occasion its application will impede 
the pursuit of the common good. When this occurs-not necessarily 
through the fault of the legislator-the judge will act equitably and thereby 
correct the legislator's means to enable the law to better reach the legisla-
tor's goal. 64 The concept of equity and its relationship to the common good 
are resources most theories do not offer. 
A judge's duty-at least in our society-is not to second-guess the 
legislative determination of how the natural law should be made effective.65 
62. Kraut, supra n. 3, at 109. 
63. Id. at 110. 
64. Summa Thealagica, supra n. 4, at 1-2, q. 96 a. 6. "[Hluman laws fail in some cases: 
wherefore it is possible sometimes to act beside the law; namely, in a case where the law fails; yet 
the act will not be evil." Id. at 1-2, q. 97 a. 3. 
Saint Thomas gives a telling example of when observance of a positive law should not occur: 
if a city has a law requiring the gates to be closed when besieged, the law should not be followed 
if there are defenders of the city outside the gates being pursued by the besiegers. Id. at 1-2, q. 96 
a. 6. The common good requires that the defenders be allowed into the city. He then provides a 
strong qualifier: only those with the authority to dispense with obedience to the law may deter-
mine when not to observe it. Id. "For if it be a matter of doubt, he must either act according to the 
letter of the law, or consult those in power." Id. 
65. The question of the role of judges in miling the natural law effective is one for each 
society to make; it is a positive and not natural law decision. In fact, S1. Thomas argues that it is 
better for judges to act in a secondary law-miling role for a number of prudential reasons. Id. at 
1-2, q. 95 a. 1; see also George. In Defense afNatural Law, supra n. 7, at 110 ("While the role of 
the judge as law-creator reasonably varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction according to each juris-
diction's own authoritative determinatianes-that is to say, each jurisdiction's positive law-
Judge Bork's idea of a body of law that is properly and fully (or almost fully) anaIyzable in 
technical terms is fully compatible with classical understandings of natural law.") (footnote 
omitted). 
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This obedience to the law is the essence of justice as lawfulness. However, 
if there is some error in the legislator's transmission through the writing of 
his intention into law-of how the natural law is to be made effective and 
further the common good-the duty of the judge is to seek the legislator's 
purpose-the legislator'S intended means to enable society to effectively 
pursue the common good-and not follow the conventional meaning of the 
law. Stated differently, if the positive law, for some reason or another, does 
not do what the legislator clearly intended it to do-the law does not appro-
priately order society to achieve the common good-then the judge must 
act in accord with the legislator's purpose. 
A judge acts unjustly when he refuses to enforce a law simply because 
the judge believes the law to be unjust or imprudent. In doing so, the judge 
"sets himself up as a rival to the body that has the authority to make the 
laws."66 As discussed above, presuming the particular society created the 
office of the legislator whose duty it is to care for the common good of the 
society, the legislator's determinations for the society on that score are 
binding. A judge's disagreement with the legislator's determinations is gen-
erally not sufficient to authorize the judge to refuse application of a law. 
The excellent judge will determine cases, if possible, on the basis of 
the conventional meaning of the laws of his society.67 The judge must pos-
sess the virtue of justice as lawfulness to give the statutory text its due 
regard. Judges must also possess and use their practical wisdom when, as 
discussed above, application of the law would produce a result contrary to 
the purpose of the law. Practical wisdom is the virtue of being able to cor-
rectly discern, in the contingent circumstances in which one finds oneself, 
what course of action is correct.68 Contingent matters are the everyday cir-
cumstances of our individual and social lives "where there is no definite 
rule" of action.69 It is in these "thick" or highly contextualized situations 
that one has need of practical wisdom, gained by experience 70 or grace,71 to 
discern the correct course of conduct. 
66. Kraut, supra n. 3, at 110. 
67. The judge has the duty to enforce the natural law as made effective in the society through 
the positive law. St. Thomas writes that 
Laws framed by man are either just or unjust. If they be just, they have the power of 
binding in conscience. from the etemallaw whence they are derived .... Now laws are 
said to be just, both from the end, when. to wit, they are ordained to the common 
good,-and from their author, that is to say, when the law that is made does not exceed 
the power of the lawgiver.-and from their form, when, to wit, burdens are laid on the 
subjects. according to an equality of proportion and with a view to the common good. 
Summa Theologica, supra n. 4, at 1-2, q. 96 a. 4. 
68. See id. at 2-2, q. 47 a. 1 ("Prudence is the knowledge of what to seek and what to 
avoid."); see also id. ("A prudent man is one who sees as it were from afar, for his sight is keen, 
and he foresees the event of uncertainties."). 
69. Nicomachean Ethics, supra n. 3, at 1140b. 
70. /d. at 1142a. 
71. Summa Theologica, supra n. 4, 2-2, q. 47 a. 14. 
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Judges will utilize their practical wisdom when faced with legal un-
derdeterminacy. The judge will have to weigh various values and the issues 
facing the judge will arise in (sometimes highly) contextualized cases. In 
these situations, the judge must determine whether the law is determinate, 
and if not, what the legislator would have intended in the case. 
IV. ApPLICATION TO STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL TEXTS 
A. Introduction 
In this last portion of the article I will apply to statutory and constitu-
tional texts the understanding of the nature of law taken from the Catholic 
intellectual tradition, a central component of which is the common good. I 
do so because of the importance of statutory and particularly constitutional 
texts to our society. The Catholic intellectual tradition and its concept of the 
common good provide a missing ingredient to explain the role of the judge 
in underdetermined cases. 
The perhaps surprising conclusion at which I arrive is that while 
judges have equitable authority in the statutory context, and may thereby 
mold the general terms of a law in light of its purpose, I also conclude that 
in the constitutional context, judges may not exercise similar equitable dis-
cretion. They must instead defer to the constructions of the constitutional 
text when the original meaning of the text of the Constitution does not de-
termine the outcome of a particular case. However, in both contexts, when 
there exists underdeterminacy caused by the underdetermined nature of the 
pertinent legal materials, judges must exercise choice and determine the law 
in the manner most conducive to the common good. 
B. Statutory Texts 
In this subsection I will discuss how the Catholic intellectual tradition 
has the conceptual resources to explain how and why legal un-
derdeterminacy arises in situations involving statutory texts, and offers di-
rection for how a judge should act in such situations. 
The understanding of legal texts taken from the Catholic intellectual 
tradition is that indeterminacy will arise in the application of statutory texts 
to concrete circumstances. This conclusion follows from the nature of legal 
texts: they are universal categorizations of social life, which is not suscepti-
ble to categorization because of its contingent nature. 
In our society, statutes are the primary means by which a legislator 
moves society to the common good. The legislator may see a problem in 
society that is impeding pursuit of the common good and create a law to 
eliminate the problem. For instance, at the end of the nineteenth century, 
many Americans believed that large trusts were harming the economic and 
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social well-being of the country72 and so, to remedy the problem, Congress 
enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act.73 Or relatedly, the legislator may see 
that a different social ordering will make members of the society more ef-
fective in their pursuit of the common good. One example is the Northwest 
Ordinance, which was enacted to organize some of the vast western territo-
ries of the United States and provided for a minimal government, defense, 
and property regulation.74 
With each statute, like all statutes, the legislator (in the first example, 
the U.S. Congress, in the second, the Continental and later the U.S. Con-
gresses) enacted a law to move society to an end. There was a particular 
goal in the mind of the legislator and the legislator communicated to society 
through the statute the authoritative means he prescribed for achieving that 
goal. The legislator used the language of the statute to communicate the 
means but, for a number of reasons, the language of the statute did not 
perfectly fit the goal in the legislator's mind. This leads to un-
derdeterminacy, and the judge in a case involving a statute where such un-
derdeterminacy arises must make a choice. 
The Catholic intellectual tradition argues that the judge should choose 
to construe the statute to achieve the legislator's purpose for which he en-
acted the statute. Law is a purposive tool, and a statute enacted by a legisla-
tor has the purpose of ordering members and institutions in society in a 
manner conducive to the effective pursuit of the common good. Because 
laws are framed universally, there will arise instances where application of 
the conventional meaning of the statutory text will lead to results contrary 
to either the particular goal of the legislator, or to the broader common 
good, the legislator's pursuit of which is presupposed by the nature of law 
(law is "for the common good, made by him who has care of the commu-
nity"). In the context of statutes passed by Congress, the judicial interpreta-
tion of the statute in light of Congress' purpose is consistent with the 
constitutional roles of Congress and the judiciary.75 
In the literature discussing statutory interpretation, Church of the Holy 
Trinity v. United States76 looms large and offers a vehicle to show how the 
Catholic intellectual tradition can provide direction and reasons for how and 
why a judge should interpret statutes. On one end of the spectrum are "tex-
tualists" such as Justice Scalia who, in A Matter of Interpretation, called 
Holy Trinity the "prototypical case involving the triumph of supposed 'leg-
72. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law 1836-1937, 246-49 (Harvard U. 
Press 1991) (discussing the motivation(s) behind the Sherman Antitrust Act). 
73. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
74. See 1 Stat. 50, 50-52 (1789) (re-enacting the Northwest Ordinance under the newly rati-
fied Constitution). 
75. See infra n. 85 and accompanying text (giving reasons why, in our society, judicial exer-
cise of equi ty is consistent with the constitutional roles of the federal branches). 
76. 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
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islative intent' (a handy cover for judicial intent) over the text of the law.'>77 
On the other end are scholars such as William Eskridge who argue that 
statutes should be interpreted in light of the context of their enactment and 
in light of the present context,78 Holy Trinity is therefore an interesting case 
because it provides an example of the application of a statute to concrete 
circumstances that would thwart the likely end of Congress, but which ap-
plication is arguably required by the conventional meaning of the statute's 
text. 
In Holy Trinity the conventional meaning of the statute, entitled "An 
Act to prohibit the importation and migration of foreigners and aliens under 
contract ... to perform labor in the United States,"79 arguably prohibited 
the defendant Episcopal parish from contracting with an English pastor to 
reside in the United States and be the parish's rector.80 However, the Su-
preme Court-admitting that what it called the "letter" of the law applied to 
the church81-ruled that Congress would never have intended such a result 
and held for the church.82 The Court looked to: (1) the particular context in 
which the statute was enacted and the evil Congress sought to remedy-
Congress was concerned with the massive waves of poor immigrants being 
brought to the United States for their cheap unskilled labor; (2) the legisla-
tive history of the statute-committee reports showing that Congress 
wanted to prohibit only the practice of contracting for manual laborers and 
not professionals; and (3) the general background of our nation regarding 
Christian ministers-one could not impute to the legislature of a Christian 
nation the desire to prohibit the importation of Christian ministers.83 The 
Court then concluded that Congress did not intend to prohibit churches 
from contracting for the services of foreign ministers.84 
The understanding of the nature of law found in the Catholic intellec-
tual tradition provides a route for judges to take when faced with Holy Trin-
ity-type cases and provides reasons and guidance for the route. When, 
during application of a statute, it becomes clear that application would 
thwart the end or goal the legislator had in mind when he enacted the stat-
ute-because the language of the statute is over- or under-inclusive-the 
judge should read the statute in light of the statutory end. The overarching 
purpose of the statute was to promote the common good, and the statute 
should therefore be read in light of that overarching purpose along with the 
particular goal of the statute. 
77. Scalia, supra n. 18. at 18. 
78. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479 
(1987). 
79. 143 U.S. at 463. 
80. Id. at 458. 
8!. Id. 
82. /d. at 472. 
83. Id. at 463-72. 
84. /d. at 472. 
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In doing so, the judge is not usurping the legislator's democratic pre-
rogative for at least three reasons.85 First, by effectuating the legislator's 
goal the judge is participating in and aiding the legislator's goal. The judge 
who cooperates with the legislator to advance his end follows the law,-the 
social ordering conceived of in the legislator's mind-and not the artifact of 
the statutory text which approximates the law in the legislator's mind.86 
Second, as was the case in Holy Trinity, the absurd result that would arise 
from application of the conventional meaning of a statute often provides the 
motivation for courts to look beyond the conventional meaning. Avoiding 
an absurd result through equitable interpretation, when licit, promotes the 
common good, and therefore should occur in such situations. Third, if the 
legislator later determines that the judge hindered the statute's attainment of 
its ordained end, the legislator may amend the statute to rectify the 
situation.87 
In a Holy Trinity-type case, the judge, to effectively judge whether a 
particular statute is over- or under-inclusive, must possess the virtue of jus-
tice as lawfulness. The judge must have the appropriate character to abide 
by the law and not lightly disregard it. In addition, once the judge has deter-
mined that the law has "run out," so to speak, he must also possess the 
virtue of practical wisdom in order to correctly determine what the legisla-
tor's purpose behind the statute requires the judge to do in light of the inap-
plicability of the statute's conventional meaning. 
Returning to the hypothetical city ordinance prohibiting vehicles in the 
park: The city council enacted the ordinance to enable members of the com-
munity to more effectively use the park for leisure and other purposes. No 
rational council, seeking to procure the common good through legislation, 
would intend the proscription to apply to an ambulance driver who drove 
the ambulance into the park to save a stricken patron. The judge in the case 
brought by the hypothetical prosecutor would be justified (required?) in 
giving a narrow reading to the ordinance and ruling that it was not applica-
85. Although I have not sufficiently researched the issue, my initial impression is that a 
further very powerful reason why the judiciary may exercise equity regarding congressional stat-
utes is that, as originally understood, '~udicial power" in Article III included such authority. See 
e.g. The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) nnhe firmness of the judicial magistracy is of 
vast importance in mitigating the severity and confining the operation of such laws."). 
86. The distinction between the textual artifact of the law here and the true law (the legisla-
tor's conception of a social ordering) may require a distinction between what I tentatively label the 
contextualized meaning of a law (the conventional and/or original meaning of a law) and the 
particularized meaning of a law (the meaning of the law as applied to a concrete case through 
adjudication). Both the contextualized meaning and the particularized meaning of a law are speci-
fications of meaning that more closely approximate the true law as conceived of by the legislator. 
I do not address these issues in this article. 
87. Depending on the particular statute in question and the statutory context, this last reason 
may not carry much weight because of the super-majority hurdles (bicameralism, presentment, 
overcoming factions), institutional constraints such as the amount of time to devote to legislative 
subjects, and inertia that must be overcome to pass legislation. As a result, although there is a 
democratic check on judicial application of a statute, the check is generally not rigorous. 
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ble to the ambulance driver. The judge would thereby cooperate with the 
council in enabling the city to pursue the common good and the particular 
good of effective use of the parks for leisure purposes. 
In sum, the interpretation of statutes must be in light of the good the 
legislator intended to effect through the enactment. As discussed above, the 
judge in a case involving a statute may have discretion when the statute is 
applied to particular circumstances; if so, the judge must then exercise that 
discretion in cooperation with the legislator's goal or end (as evidenced in 
the statute) and within the legislator's broader pursuit of the common good. 
In the statutory context there is a second manner in which a judge will 
have discretion, but his discretion will not be (as?) circumscribed by the 
legislator'S prior goal or end. A judge will have discretion in cases when he 
must determine what are the applicable legal materials, the relative author-
ity of the pertinent legal materials, the relationship of the pertinent legal 
materials, and how those factors play out in a given case: in essence, the 
judge must determine what the law is. In these situations, the statute at issue 
will be one of the pertinent legal materials (perhaps the most important), 
and in dealing with the meaning of the statute the judge's discretion will be 
circumscribed by the legislator'S goal; but there will remain other non-cir-
cumscribed pertinent legal materials, and the judge will have to determine 
their relationship to the statute. 
Riggs v. Palmer provides an example of this second form of discretion. 
The state's statute governing wills was clearly relevant, but the New York 
Court of Appeals still had to determine how that statute interacted with the 
other pertinent legal materials and apply the result of this determination to 
the case. That discretion required the judges to exercise their judgment to 
answer the question: what is the law governing the case? 
Unlike where a judge is attempting to discern the meaning of a statute 
and the judge is a partner in the legislator's ordering of society toward the 
common good and his discretion is accordingly circumscribed by the legis-
lator's goal in enacting the statute, when a judge is performing the broader 
judicial task of synthesizing an area of law his discretion-his judgment-
in doing so is much less circumscribed. Instead, the legal materials may be 
underdetermined, and so the judge will have the opportunity to choose dif-
ferent syntheses of the legal materials. The judge is choosing "what the law 
is" that governs the case. The particular area of the law the judge is dealing 
with may offer some guidance as to the end(s) of that area of law88 which 
the judge would accordingly take into account; but that will not always be 
the case, and in any event, the judge must exercise judgment to discern the 
end(s) of the area of law, and the end(s) of an area of law will only provide 
88. For example, one of the ends of real property law is security of title and stability because 
of the great value placed on real property (family homes for example) by owners and our society. 
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guidance to the judge and will not determine the correct ordering of the 
legal materials. 
Consequently, judges in many cases involving statutes will be left with 
ineliminable discretion. As noted earlier, some scholars will either attempt 
to argue that judges in fact have no discretion or that their discretion is so 
pervasive as to destroy the rule oflaw. The position that I believe is offered 
by the Catholic intellectual tradition is that judges have some discretion 
because of the underdetermined nature of the legal materials governing 
cases. The Catholic intellectual tradition also affirms, however, that judges, 
as officials within the official apparatus of society charged with the care of 
the common good-the state-must utilize their discretion to further the 
common good and the end(s) of the particular area of law in question. 
Stated differently, judges must choose that synthesis of the legal materials 
that would make the social pursuit of the common good most effective. And 
to do so, judges must possess virtue, especially justice as lawfulness and 
practical wisdom. 
Returning to the Riggs case, The judges in Riggs were faced with legal 
materials including, among other things: the New York Statute of Wills; 
precedent from New York and other jurisdictions on the interpretation of 
will statutes; precedent utilizing the general common law principle that no 
man shall profit by his own wrong; the inequity of allowing Elmer to profit 
from murder; and the background constitutional principle of separation of 
powers between the legislature (which made the will statute) and the judici-
ary. The judges had to synthesize these legal materials, and in doing so they 
exercised discretion. The majority could have concluded, as did the dissent, 
that the principle of separation of powers was the ordering principle for the 
area of law and which required the court to read the will statute literally 
(and for Elmer's benefit). Instead, the majority ordered the pertinent legal 
materials differently. In doing so, the majority concluded that justice and 
equity and the common good were better served under its ordering-its 
synthesis-of the legal materials. The majority and dissent answered the 
question-what is the law-differently by choosing different theoretical 
structures for the area of law. 
C. Constitutional Texts 
In this subsection I will discuss how the Catholic intellectual tradition 
has the conceptual resources to understand how and why legal un-
derdeterminacy arises in situations involving constitutional texts, and offers 
reasons for how a judge should act in such situations. 
1. Nature of the Constitution 
The text of the Constitution is a legal text that, on the understanding of 
the Catholic intellectual tradition, is a purposive instrument the nature of 
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which is to order society to an effective pursuit of the common good.89 The 
"legislator" of the Constitution is the People of our society who, in 1787-
1789, ratified the Constitution, giving it binding, authoritative, legal status. 
The People meant to accomplish the broad goal of securing the common 
good for our society and a number of subsidiary goals. 
The Preamble to the Constitution identifies that a more effective pur-
suit of the common good was the overarching goal of the People. The Peo-
ple recognized that the union under the Articles of Confederation was 
incomplete and sought to make it "more perfect."90 The People sought to 
re-order society to achieve justice, domestic peace, external defense, and 
the general welfare of the members of our society.91 This is the essence of 
the common good. The People recognized that the common good, and thus 
the individual goods of the members of the society, were not being achieved 
under the Articles of Confederation and sought to use the Constitution to re-
order society to achieve those ends. 
The specific clauses and the structure of the Constitution, read in light 
of its original meaning, identify the means by which the People sought to 
secure the common good. The People authorized the federal government to 
utilize a number of means to pursue the common good, but wisely did so in 
a limited fashion through the enumeration of powers and with explicit tex-
tual limits such as those in the Bill of Rights. 
In sum, like statutory text, the Constitution is law subject to analysis 
within the Catholic intellectual tradition. 
2. Role of the Judge in Constitutional Judicial Review 
The role of the judge in the constitutional context is different from his 
role in the statutory context. The Constitution, in our legal system, is the 
trump card. If a litigant has the Constitution on his side, he wins. The Con-
stitution is the primary authorization and limitation on all government ac-
tion-including judicial action-given by our society to the state. 
Constitutional judicial review is the process by which federal judges 
declare acts of the Congress (or President?2 constitutional or unconstitu-
tionaL The exercise of this power by federal judges has been and will con-
tinue to be a contentious topic. The reason for this unease with 
constitutional judicial review was aptly summarized by Ronald Dworkin: 
"It seems grotesquely to constrict the moral sovereignty of the people them-
89. For a discussion of the purposive nature of the Constitution, that is, the Constitution as 
the means through which our society ordered itself to the effective pursuit of the common good, 
see Strang, supra n. 48, at 909. 
90. U.S. Const. preamble. 
91. ld. 
92. I will concentrate on Congress. 
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selves."93 In other words, what warrant do unelected judges have to thwart 
the will of the People's democratically elected representatives? 
The traditional justification for the exercise of constitutional judicial 
review is found in Federalist 78.94 There, Alexander Hamilton argued that 
constitutional judicial review was not undemocratic because the courts, in 
exercising that authority, acted as the agent of the People, enforcing the 
People's previously enunciated constitutional limitations on the legisla-
ture.95 Constitutional judicial review, on this reading, was democracy-en-
hancing: it enabled the People to order its social life and constrain its 
government agents into the future.96 As Hamilton stated, "[T]he courts were 
designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature 
in order ... to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority."97 
This justification was utilized by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. 
Madison to establish the propriety of constitutional judicial review.98 Mar-
shall echoed Hamilton stating: "that the people have an original right to 
establish, for their future government, such principles as, in their opinion, 
shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis, on which the whole 
American fabric has been erected. "99 
3. Courts Must Follow the Text and Original Meaning of the 
Constitution 
As with statutory cases, judges in constitutional cases must, if possible, 
follow the text of the Constitution. I have argued elsewhere that, consonant 
with the Federalist 78 justification for judicial review, in cases where the 
courts exercise judicial review, judges must follow the original meaning of 
the constitutional text. IOO Therefore, courts act legitimately in striking down 
acts of Congress that contravene the original meaning of the Constitution. 
93. Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 4 
(Harv. U. Press 1996). 
94. The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). I discuss the implications of Hamilton's 
defense and the modem rejection of the defense beginning with Alexander Bickel in Lee 1. Strang, 
The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philosophical Traditions within Constitutional Interpreta-
tion: Originalism and the Aristotelian Tradition, 2 Geo. 1.L. & Pub. Policy 523, 523-24, 574-98 
(2004). 
95. The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
96. See Strang, supra n. 94, at 562-98 (discussing the role "democracy" has played in argu-
ments over constitutional judicial review). 
97. The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), 
98. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
99. !d. at 176. 
100. See Strang, supra n. 48, at 982-1001 (providing three arguments why the original mean-
ing of the Constitution is the binding, authoritative meaning which warrants federal judges exer-
cising constitutional judicial review). 
The original meaning of the text provides context to the Constitution's text. It fills out the 
words on the parchment preventing a detached and a-temporal meaning. The original meaning 
provides a fuller and deeper meaning that courts may draw upon in deciding constitutional cases. 
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4. Courts Must Defer to Legislative Determinations When the 
Constitution's Text and Original Meaning Do Not 
Determine the Outcome of a Case 
However, like all language and like statutory texts, the original mean-
ing of the Constitution has limits. When, as often occurs in constitutional 
cases, the Constitution's text and original meaning do not provide sufficient 
guidance, that is, when a case is underdetermined by the original meaning, 
the court's warrant to strike down acts of the elected branches has reached 
its limit. 
Unlike in the statutory context, where in cooperation with the legisla-
ture, the court may broaden or constrain the conventional meaning of the 
language of a statute to fulfill the legislature's purpose, in the constitutional 
context, the court must defer to the legislature's determination-or what, 
following other scholars, I shall call a constitutional constructionlO1-when 
the original meaning of the text of the Constitution is underdetermined. 
Here is why: when the text of the Constitution and its original meaning do 
not provide a determinate answer to a question-when there are two or 
more answers consistent with the original meaning-the Federalist 78 justi-
fication for constitutional judicial review is inapplicable and our constitu-
tional social ordering, through Article I, gives to Congress the authority to 
determine how best to order our society towards the common good. 
This argument draws on the distinction between constitutional inter-
pretation and constitutional construction. 102 In constitutional interpretation 
the interpreter is drawing forth the meaning of the Constitution. To discern 
the Constitution's meaning, the interpreter will look to the text, the structure 
of the Constitution, and the original meaning of the text. Judges and law-
yers are especially adept at interpretation, having learned the tools of the 
craft during law school and in practice. And judges have been authorized by 
our society to authoritatively interpret the Constitution during constitutional 
judicial review. 103 
Constitutional construction, by contrast, goes beyond the meaning of 
the Constitution. Constitutional construction takes up where interpretation 
has left off. Because of the limited nature of language, the Constitution's 
original meaning will at some point become underdetermined. This occurs 
when there are two or more possible answers consistent with the original 
101. See e.g. Barnett, supra n. 15, at ch. 5; Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: 
Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning ch. 1 (Harv. U. Press 1999); Whittington, supra n. 
15, at ch. 5-6. 
102. Here, I follow the lead of Professors Whittington and Barnett and their thoughtful 
discussions. 
103. See Strang, supra n. 48, at 989 ("Pan of that decision [our society's 'prudential, social 
ordering decision'] was the determination that the judiciary was bound by the original meaning of 
the Constitution."). 
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meaning of the Constitution, even after all the tools of interpretation have 
been utilized. 104 
As explained above, the only warrant possessed by the judiciary to 
overrule Congress is the Constitution itself, but if the original meaning of 
the Constitution has been exhausted, and there is no determinate answer to a 
question, then Congress' determination of what the common good re-
quires-its construction-should prevail over a contrary judgment by the 
jUdiciary. 
This is true for a number of reasons. First, our society established the 
Constitution to enable us to effectively pursue the common good. The three 
branches of the federal government were each given a particular role that 
was both authorized and limited by the Constitution. The federal legislature 
was entrusted, through Article I, with the primary care of the common good 
of the national society. The federal judiciary, through Article III, was en-
trusted with adjudicating disputes under the Constitution. In sum, under our 
Constitution's social ordering, Congress' judgments on what the common 
good requires are binding, and the federal courts cannot thwart those deci-
sions absent a mandate in the source of our social ordering: the 
Constitution. 
Second is the argument from democracy. Congress is elected by the 
People unlike the federal judiciary, which consists of appointed, life-ten-
ured judges. In our society, absent a compelling reason, judgments of the 
democratically elected legislature are entitled to greater authority than judg-
ments by unelected entities. !Os This primacy of the legislature has repeat-
edly been recognized by the Supreme Court itself: the legislature is "the 
appropriate representative body through which the public makes democratic 
choices among alternative solutions to social and economic problems."lo6 
Third, as a practical matter, Congress has a greater ability to under-
stand the problems of society-what is impeding the effective pursuit of the 
common good-and of formulating effective measures to better order soci-
ety for effective pursuit of the common good. Congress has constant contact 
with its constituents while the courts are isolated. Congress has the re-
sources to study problems while the courts are dependent on the efforts of 
the parties before it. The courts are "institutionally unsuited to gather the 
facts upon which economic predictions can be made."!07 Congress can 
proactively address issues while the courts must wait for a party to initiate 
104. However, this does not mean that constitutional constructions are completely indetermi-
nate. On the contrary, the constructor is constrained by the meaning of the Constitution uncovered 
through interpretation. underdetermined though it is. 
105. See John Hart Ely. Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 5 (Harv. U. 
Press 1980) (HWe have as a society from the beginning, and now almost instinctively, accepted the 
notion that a representative democracy must be our form of government."). 
106. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981). 
107. General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 308 (1997). 
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litigation. Lastly, Congress has the ability to make compromises that bal-
ance competing goods and move society forward while the courts are re-
strained by precedent and legal principles. For these and other reasons, 
Congress is a more effective body to entrust with the guidance of society 
toward the common good. 
When facing application of statutory text, a court is authorized to both 
interpret and construct the text. The situation is different regarding applica-
tion of constitutional text because our society has limited the scope of judi-
cial power in this context. Judges have the authority from Article III to 
interpret the Constitution: they must apply the original meaning of the Con-
stitution, trumping congressional statutes if need be. However, the office of 
federal judge does not have the authority to trump congressional statutes 
beyond the requirements of the original meaning. In other words, once the 
original meaning runs out, so to speak, the authority of the federal judiciary 
has also reached its limit (at least vis-a-vis a congressional statute). It is this 
absence of authorization to act in the face of congressional action when the 
meaning of the Constitution's text is underdetermined that distinguishes the 
role of the courts in this context from the statutory context. There, when 
statutes are underdetermined, judges act in cooperation with Congress to 
effectuate Congress' pursuit of the common good, and for good reason. 
In sum, when the original meaning of the Constitution is determinate, 
the courts are warranted in overriding the determinations of the elected 
branches. However, when the meaning of the Constitution is un-
derdeterminate and the situation is one of constitutional construction, the 
courts must defer to the constructions of the other branches. 
5. Courts Must Exercise Justice and Practical Wisdom When 
Confronted with Underdeterminacy of Legal Materials 
There are further reasons for legal underdeterminacy in the constitu-
tional context: the underdeterminacy caused by identification of pertinent 
legal materials; the relationship between the pertinent legal materials; the 
relative authoritative force of the legal materials; and the choice of justifica-
tory legal framework for the materials. 
Ours is a mature legal system; therefore, in most constitutional cases, 
as with statutory cases, there will be more pertinent legal materials than 
simply the positive legal text in any given case. For example, in a case 
involving Congress' Commerce Clause authority, the pertinent legal materi-
als will include: the text of the Clause; the structure of the Constitution; the 
original meaning of the Clause (including its level of generality, and 
whether it is a rule, standard, or principle); precedent involving the Com-
merce Clause (applications of the Clause to other contexts); other constitu-
tional limitations on Congress' Commerce Clause authority (such as the 
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Eleventh Amendment) including text, original meaning, and precedent; and 
past congressional and executive practice under the Commerce Clause. 
When faced with legal underdeterminacy caused by the underdeter-
mined nature of legal materials, the courts cannot defer to the legislature 
because the question at issue is, what is the law?108 The question, what is 
the law, can only be answered by the person asking it. Only the court decid-
ing a case can answer the question, what is the law, because the process of 
determining what the law is involves the exercise of judgment in which 
different people, with different levels of respect for the law and practical 
wisdom-different portions of judicial virtue-will arrive at different con-
clusions. Judges cannot defer to, for example, Congress' understanding of 
what the law is in a particular case because Congress has not been asked the 
question. And more fundamentally, our Constitution has lodged with the 
federal courts the "judicial power"-the authority to decide cases-which 
encompasses the authority to determine what the law is, and Congress has 
only a limited constitutional role in deciding cases or determining the gov-
erning law in a case. 
Hence, the courts must themselves operate within this area of un-
derdeterminacy. The Catholic intellectual tradition's concept of the com-
mon good offers guidance to courts when they are faced with 
underdeterminacy of the legal materials. When legal materials are un-
derdetermined, they can be organized and brought to bear in different ways 
in a case such that two or more outcomes are possible. The court faced with 
legal underdeterminacy-with the question, what is the law-must exercise 
its discretion in a manner that best enables society to effectively pursue the 
common good. The court must choose that legal justificatory framework for 
the legal materials that would make the area of law best able to order soci-
ety toward the common good. 109 
As in the statutory context, judges determining what the law is must 
exercise the virtues of justice as lawfulness and practical wisdom (among 
108. The law is composed of legal rules and principles, positive law and case law, and the 
justificatory structure of the law, so to answer the question of what is the law one must identify the 
pertinent legal materials. determine how they relate to each other. and determine their authorita-
tive force. 
109. The text of this article is substantially the same as that given at the conference. In re-
sponse to one question by a conference participant, and upon further reflection, I believe that this 
subsection needs revision to better accommodate what in my view is the primary focus of consti-
tutional interpretation: the original meaning. The conference participant asked: if, as I argued, the 
original meaning is the binding meaning of the Constitution, then is not the original meaning the 
sole legal material that federal judges are authorized to use? In other words, given my commit-
ment to the original meaning, judges who use legal materials other than the original meaning to 
rule in a manner not in accord with the original meaning would violate their oath of office. I 
partially address this in my forthcoming article, An Originalist Theory of Precedent, 36 N.M. L. 
Rev. __ (forthcoming 2006), where I address the question of what a judge should do when 
faced with mistaken nonoriginalist precedent. In a future article I hope to explain the relationship 
between the original meaning and other legal materials, in the constitutional context, more fully. 
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many others). The virtue of justice will enable the judge to respectfully 
determine whether the judge has discretion regarding the legal materials, 
and practical wisdom will enable the judge to choose the justificatory legal 
framework that best advances the common good. 
D. Summary 
Part IV discussed how the understanding of law offered by the Catho-
lic intellectual tradition has the conceptual resources to explain why legal 
underdeterminacy arises and to give reasons as to how judges should re-
spond. The context in which legal underdeterminacy arises matters. In the 
statutory context, when judges are faced with underdeterminacy caused by 
the universal nature of legal texts, they must cooperate with the legislator to 
advance the legislator's end; but in the constitutional context, when the 
original meaning of the Constitution is underdetermined, courts must defer 
to legislative constructions. However, when judges confront un-
derdeterminacy of legal materials more generally, in both contexts they 
must exercise their discretion in such a manner as to enable society to more 
effectively pursue the common good. 
V. CONCLUSION 
I argued in this article that the concept of the common good-a con-
cept of which the modern secular legal academy has lost sight-plays an 
essential role in an adequate theory of legal and, more specifically, constitu-
tional interpretation. I discussed the secular academy's understanding of the 
determinacy of legal materials and showed that, occasionally, outcomes in 
legal cases are underdetermined. I then described two analytically distinct 
causes of this underdeterminacy: the universal nature of legal texts as ap-
plied to concrete, contingent circumstances, and the underdetermined nature 
of and relationship between legal materials more generally. 
Second, I provided a rough overview of the nature of law provided by 
the Catholic intellectual tradition and the centrality to this understanding of 
the common good. 
Lastly, I applied this understanding to statutory and constitutional in-
terpretation and showed how in each instance the common good must play 
a role because of the underdetermined nature of legal adjudication. 
